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The United Nations and Democratic




After each war there is a little less democracy to save.
- Brooks Atkinson, Once around the Sun
Commentary on "second-generation" U.N. peacekeeping operations
has focused mainly on trends in civil conffict management and on the
difficulties they pose for the United Nations.' Like the Organization
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John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and the Monterey
Institute of International Studies, and a Certificate of Negotiation and Alternative
Dispute Resolution from the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. Em-
ployment interlaced with his educational pursuits includes, among other positions,
Civic Education Project lecturer in public administration and negotiation analysis at
New Bulgarian University and International University in Sofia, Bulgaria for the
1993-94 academic year, and an internship with the U.N. Department for Disarma-
ment Affairs in Geneva in 1988.
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Farrell.
1. Important reviews of contemporary peacekeeping include: Jarat Chopra, Back
to the Drawing Board: International Peacekeeping Efforts, 51 Bulletin Atomic Scien-
tists 29 (1995) [hereinafter Chopra, Back to the Drawing Board]; BEYOND TRADITION-
AL PEACEKEEPING (Donald Daniel & Bradd Hayes eds., 1995); Alvaro De Soto &
Graciana Del Castillo, Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements: Staying
the Course in El Salvador, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 189 (1995); MICHAEL DOYLE, UN
PEACEKEEPING IN CAMBODIA: UNTAC'S Cw.T, MANDATE (1995); STEVEN RATNER, THE
NEW UN PEACEKEEPING: BUILDING PEACE IN LANDS OF CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD
WAR (1995); THE UNITED NATIONS AND CIVIL WARS (Thomas Weiss ed., 1995); Alvaro
De Soto & Graciana Del Castillo, Obstacles to Peacebuilding, 94 FOR. POL 69 (1994);
Philippe Guillot, The United Nations and Internal Conflict Resolution: Promoting
Western Standards of Democracy through Multidimensional Peace Support Operations,
ELSA L. Rev. 93 (1994); Ramesh Thakur, From Peacekeeping to Enforcement: The
UN Operation in Somalia, 32 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 387 (1994); Ramses Amer, The
United Nations' Peacekeeping Operation in Cambodia: Overview and Assessment, 15
CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 211 (1993); ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN
INTERNAL CONFLICTS (Lori Damrosch ed., 1993) [hereinafter ENFORCING RESTRAINT];
PAUL DIEHL, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING (1993); THE EVOLUTION OF U.N. PEACE-
KEEPING: CASE STUDIES AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (William Durch ed., 1993) [here-
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itself, however, such treatises fail to focus beyond the short-term and
evaluate the consequences and responsibilities of the international
community by using closure of civil war as a means to expand demo-
cratic liberalism. Foreign aid and diplomatic pressure long have been
customary in international relations, but the rally of intergovernmen-
tal organizations around a fairly broad consensus regarding internal
intervention in pursuit of desired ends is quite new. The novelty lies in
the combination of two concepts-the willingness of the international
community to interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state
when its government conducts or allows human rights violations, and
the will to extend such enforcement to agreements on civil and political
rights that epitomize democratic ideals. The hesitancy involved in such
an extension, however, has made it difficult to plan the progressive
stages necessary for transition from civil war or authoritarian govern-
ment to irreversible democracy.
A wave of collective democratic institution-building began with
U.N. supervision of elections in Namibia upon its independence in
1989. Over the next half decade, through operations in Angola, Cambo-
dia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Somalia, and Western Sahara, the
United Nations has promoted varying degrees of democratization. More
recently, its goal has been to actually restore democracy in Haiti.2
What has not been fully explored is how administrative intervention
can be justified and what, exactly, the international community is
trying to achieve. The principle of sovereignty, as it has evolved, argu-
ably allows for some degree of protection of civil and political rights
and assistance of government administration. Actual movement in this
direction by the international community, however, has aimed at pro-
moting development of democratic institutions and practices in ways
that fail to take into account the needs of a democratic consolidation
process, particularly in states that have emerged from ruinous civil
war. Quick to declare "success" and move on, the international commu-
nity has, in the process, virtually ignored problems of public adminis-
tration. The member states that determine U.N. activities have paid
inafter THE EVOLUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING]; Marrack Goulding, The Evolution of
United Nations Peacekeeping, 69 INT'L AFF. 451 (1993); David Holiday & William
Stanley, Building the Peace: Preliminary Lessons from El Salvador, 46 J. INT'L AFF.
415 (1993); and John MacKinlay & Jarat Chopra, Second Generation Multinational
Operations, 15 WASH. Q. 113 (1992).
2. Following is a list of operations whose acronyms are referenced in this arti-
cle: la Mission des Nations Unies pour le Referundum du Sahara Occidental
(MINURSO); l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC); los Observadores
de las Naciones Unidas en El Salvador (ONUSAL); l'Oplration des Nations Unies au
Mozambique (ONUMOZ); the U.N. Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM); the U.N.
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF); the U.N. Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); the
U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL); the U.N. Operations in Somalia
(UNOSOM); the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR); and the U.N. Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).
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little regard to corruption and other abuses of discretion by the various
branches of government and their undemocratic connections with
elites, problems that could lead to legislative deadlock or, worse, to a
resumption of armed hostilities.3 With regard to Bosnia-Hercegovina,
while the Dayton accords provided for the adjudication of human
rights abuses, they paid scant attention to implementation of complex
power-sharing arrangements. Indeed, they gave little thought to events
beyond the first six-to-nine months of operations.'
The United Nations should look beyond its custom of formally
ending centralized arrangements after the first elections of a new dem-
ocratic system of government. Instead, it should regard peace opera-
tions as a continuum of third party dispute settlement extending from
the mediation of the conflict and the early stages of peace accord im-
plementation all the way through to consolidation of democratic insti-
tutions. Experience in the early stages of the implementation of peace
accords shows that parties often remain highly distrustful, exploiting
ambiguity in the accords and lack of diligence in oversight on the part
of the international community. Such practices are likely to carry over
into the daily operation of government, even after "free and fair" elec-
tions have been held. If what the United Nations is trying to achieve is
lasting peace through accords based on democratic governance, it
3. Works addressing the shifting mores of sovereignty include: Geoffrey Howe,
Sovereignty, Democracy and Human Rights, 66 POL. Q. 126 (1995); BEYOND
WESTPHALIA?: STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (Gene Lyons &
Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995) [hereinafter BEYOND WESTPHALIA?]; Jarat Chopra &
Thomas G. Weiss, Sovereignty is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian
Intervention, 6 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 95 (1994); Tom Farer, Collectively Defending
Democracy in a World of Sovereign States: The Western Hemisphere's Prospect, 15
HUM. RTs. Q. 716 (1993); Lori Damrosch, Politics across Borders: Nonintervention
and Nonforcible Influence over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1989); Thomas
Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992);
and David Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U.
TOL. L. REV. 253 (1992). Some problems related to democratization can be found in
the following: DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY: COMPARATIVE RESEARCH IN HONOR OF J.F.P.
BLONDEL 244-45 (Ian Budge & David McKay eds., 1994) [hereinafter DEVELOPING
DEMOCRACY]; GERAINT PARRY & MICHAEL MORAN, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION
(1994); BUILDING DEMOCRACY?: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF DEMOCRATISATION
IN EASTERN EUROPE (Geoffrey Pridham et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter BUILDING DE-
MOCRACY?]; Doh Chull Shin, On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and
Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research, 47 WORLD POL. 135, 144 (1994); and
BOUND TO CHANGE: CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE (Peter
Volten ed., 1992) [hereinafter BOUND TO CHANGE].
4. There are, however, provisions for a Human Rights Chamber and an om-
budsman with significant powers of inquiry. See R. Jeffrey Smith & Dana Priest,
Troops Given Wide Range of Authority, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1995, at A36. There is
also a reconciliation program being developed that is aimed at long-term grass roots
developments, but which still does not address the problems of government adminis-
tration. See Christine Spolar, Serbs Reassured on Safety after Sarajevo is Unified:
Presidency Seeks Ways to 'Break Wall of Distrust,' WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 1995, at
A10.
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needs to maintain a formal, centralized oversight role in the
peacebuilding period to assure all parties involved that security and
civil and political rights will be observed by and for all parties, as
dictated by the joint agreement under which they have agreed to oper-
ate. With an invitation by the parties to hold power of consiliarius or
consent jurisdiction - offering ongoing advice and even exercising
quasi-adjudicatory powers in the case of an impasse - the United
Nations would be working in respect of sovereignty, not in spite of it.
II. SOVEREIGNTY LOST?
Intervene. 0 descend as a dove or
A furious papa or a mild engineer, but descend.
- W. H. Auden, "Spain 1937"
Much of the debate over the legitimacy of U.N. intervention cen-
ters on the customary principle of sovereignty emphasized in article
2(7) of the Charter, which prohibits interference in "matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." A 1949 re-
view accurately predicted the salience of this paragraph: "Being
couched in general terms, its interpretation will become a decisive
factor in determining whether the United Nations will be an organiza-
tion of large and expanding responsibilities or be kept within relatively
narrow limits . . . ."' The juridical principle of sovereignty has its for-
mal origins in the treaties of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty
Years' War in Europe in 1648. The treaties bestowed autonomous pow-
er upon the various ruling figures of Western Europe to end the chaot-
ic climate caused by prolific inter-territorial interference, with an ex-
pectation that individual sovereigns could be entrusted to maintain
order within their borders so as to conduct stable relations with oth-
ers.
6
5. LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 113 (2d ed. 1949), quoted in ABIODUN WIL-
LIAMS, Introduction to ARTICLE 2(7) REVISITED 2 ACUNS Reports and Papers no.5,
1994 (Academic Council on the United Nations system).
6. LOUIS W. GOODMAN, Democracy, Sovereignty, and Intervention, 9 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 27, 27 (1993); and Gene Lyons & Michael Mastanduno, Introduc-
tion: International Intervention, State Sovereignty, and the Future of International
Society, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?, supra note 3, at 5. While the treaties were mostly
designed to cover religious matters, each sovereign was given the basis for territorial
sovereignty (landeshoheit), even over the conduct of foreign policy.
Since majority interests were safeguarded in the new Imperial Assembly
[of the Holy Roman Empire], to the extent of allowing a minority veto
in all matters where the assembly could not be considered a united
body-not just in religion, but also in all political and fiscal matters
somehow attributable to it-the Imperial Assembly came to resemble a
permanent ambassadorial conference rather than a parliament.
THOMAS MUNCK, SEVENTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE: STATE, CONFLICT AND THE SOCIAL
ORDER IN EUROPE, 1598-1700, at 23 (1990).
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The Westphalian system was never fully sacrosanct, as its Treaty
of OsnabrUck made provisions ensuring the religious tolerance of mi-
norities. Similarly, "minorities treaties" at the end of the first World
War required protection of minority rights, as well as mechanisms to
oversee their implementation.! Norms of international relations that
have become customary international law, such as diplomatic immuni-
ty, or certain jus cogens principles of human rights, such as the prohi-
bition on genocide, further delimit state sovereignty. Moreover, as a
very exercise of their sovereign rights, states may relinquish partial
sovereignty by adhering to formal international agreements. 8 Interna-
tional law arguably is not much more than a registry of such relin-
quishments' The International Court of Justice has stated that it
cannot find "any obstacle" to the authority of a state to bind itself by
consent in a way that would affect domestic policy,10 and many mul-
tilateral conventions have maintained ongoing regulatory decision-
making powers binding on all signatories.11 With ever-multiplying
rules of interstate interaction, in fact, the negative connotation of "in-
tervention" generally no longer applies to non-forcible outside assis-
tance that strengthens the state in question, even without government
invitation.
12
Whether a given intervention "strengthens" a state is no less
obscure than whether a matter is "essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction"; thus the exercise of discretion by the international com-
7. E.g., Friedrich Kratochwil, Sovereignty as Dominium: Is There A Right of
Humanitarian Intervention?, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?, supra note 3, at 30; HURST
HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION
OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 52-54 (1990).
8. See, e.g., The S.S. Wimbledon (Gr. Brit., Fr., Italy, Japan, Pol. v. Ger.), 1923
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 25 (Aug. 17) (stating "[tihe court declines to see, in the
conclusion of any treaty by which a State undertakes to perform or refrain from
performing a particular act, an abandonment of its sovereignty . . . the right of
entering into international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty"), cited
in IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 288 (4th ed. 1990).
9. Jack Donnelly, State Sovereignty and International Intervention: The Case of
Human Rights, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?, supra note 3, at 118.
10. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. REP. 131 (June 17) 259, quoted in Domingo Acevedo, The Haitian
Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test of Effectiveness in Protecting Democracy, in
ENFORCING RESTRAINT, supra note 1, at 129. Note, however, that this may not ex-
tend to the use of military force, even pursuant to treaty provisions, as it may vio-
late jus cogens principles of sovereignty and territorial sovereignty that would make
treaties void ab initio under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See
generally, David Wippman, Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 607 (1995).
11. HANNUM, supra note 7, at 21-22. Nevertheless, Hannum supports the notion
of the Wimbledon case (supra note 8) that such voluntary delegation of
decisionmaking is not a limitation of sovereignty, but "one of the ultimate sovereign
acts." HANNUM, supra note 7, at 22.
12. Nicholas Onuf, Intervention for the Common Good, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?,
supra note 3, at 49-50.
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munity brings a political element to international policy-making. Inis
Claude states that while ratification of the U.N. Charter puts "practi-
cally every conceivable subject" in the international domain, art. 2(7)
could be interpreted as weakening the whole Charter." Thus, inter-
pretation of this clause operates in the context of inter-state relation-
ships, which are political by their very nature.14 The Permanent
Court of International Justice ruled that whether a certain matter is
within the sole jurisdiction of a state "depends on the development of
international relations."5 Similarly, the International Court of Justice
stated that the General Assembly retains "a measure of discretion with
respect to the forms and procedures by which [a] right is to be real-
ized." 6 As a consequence, international law remains too ephemeral to
rely upon in times of crisis, and "the Security Council makes decisions
to intervene not according to objective criteria but, rather, according to
what the international political traffic will bear.""
The General Assembly attempted to define inadmissible state
intervention, starting with the adoption of a declaratory statement in
1965 and ending with a more detailed declaration in 1981 that failed
to gain consensus."s More recently, as one scholar noted, "the pace of
U.N. implementation since 1990 has outstripped the international
agenda of fifty years"9 in terms of providing for foreign intervention
in support of human rights.20 The protection of fundamental human
rights has its origins as far back as the Concert of Europe's drive to
abolish the slave trade, but in the last half century the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and the Helsinki Final Act-among many other treaties, declarations,
and so on-set new, integral standards.2' Since the late 1980s, the
13. INIS L. CLAUDE, SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 166-67 (4th ed. 1971).
14. Id. at 183-84.
15. Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (Gr. Brit. v. Fr.), 1923
P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 143 (Feb. 7) (advisory opinion), cited in Weiss & Chopra,
Sovereignty under Siege: From Intervention to Humanitarian Space, in BEYOND
WESTPHALIA?, supra note 3, at 96.
16. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 36 (Oct. 16) (advisory opinion), cited in
HANNUM, supra note 7, at 38.
17. Weiss, The United Nations and Civil Wars at the Dawn of the Twenty-First
Century, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND CIVIL WARS, supra note 1, at 201. The deci-
sion by European governments in the case of the former Yugoslavia to extend the
Helsinki principle of territorial integrity to internal as well as international frontiers
demonstrates the influence of politics in interpretations of law. See Marc Weller, The
International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569.
18. U.N. G.A. Res. 20/2131 (1965), and U.N. G.A. Res. 36/103 (1981), respective-
ly, cited in Onuf, supra note 12, at 50.
19. Jarat Chopra, U.N. Civil Governance in Trust, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
CIVIL WARS, supra note 1, at 69.
20. Id.
21. E.g., Robert Jackson, International Community beyond the Cold War, in BE-
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documents were used to justify humanitarian intervention without con-
sent, instigated in part by the General Assembly itself. A G.A. resolu-
tion in 1988 recognized the right of civilians to international aid and
the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as providers of
such aid, and a resolution two years later reinforced this by designat-
ing access corridors of "tranquility" for aid workers.22 Then, in 1991,
the Security Council authorized humanitarian intervention for the first
time, providing for protection of Kurdish populations in northern Iraq
despite Iraqi charges of a violation of sovereignty. The U.N. action
consequently marked a significant turning point in international cus-
tom regarding multilateral intervention that would be influential in
Somalia and several other states in the ensuing years."
III. COLLECTIVE DEMOCRATIZATION
Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible, but man's inclina-
tion to injustice makes democracy necessary.
-Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light
and the Children of Darkness
Political acceptance of state intervention has grown exponentially
to include protection of a broad band of human rights. The Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights affirms the right of indi-
viduals to participate in government either directly or through repre-
sentatives and "[t]o vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by
secret ballot."24 Some scholars have held that pressuring governments
that do not come to power by popular suffrage does not violate the
principle of non-intervention, as sovereignty lies with the people, not
the government.2 5 Thomas Franck argues that "democratic entitle-
YOND WESTPHALIA?, supra note 3, at 68. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
U.N. G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), and International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, U.N. G.A. Annex to Res 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No.
16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) adopted 15 Dec. 1966, entered into force 23 Mar.
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
22. U.N. G.A. Res. 43/131 (1988); U.N. G.A. Res. 45/100 (1990); noted in Weiss
& Chopra, supra note 15, at 95.
23. Paul Lewis, UN Votes to Condemn Handling of Iraq Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
6, 1991, at 6. See also, Marc Boutin, Somalia: The Legality of U.N. Forcible Human-
itarian Intervention, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 138, 147-48 (1994) (citing U.N.
Doc. S/Res.688, 1991). Then Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar would write
in his final annual report that year: "The principle of non-interference with the
essential domestic jurisdiction of states cannot be regarded as a protective barrier
behind which human rights could be massively or systematically violated with impu-
nity." Cited in Chopra, Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 1, at 32.
24. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 21, art. 25.
25. E.g., Farer, supra note 3, at 721. See also Damrosch, supra note 3, at 36;
FERNANDO TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALI-
TY (1988), cited in MAHMOOD MONSHIPOURI, DEMOCRATIZATION, LIBERALIZATION AND
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ment" is fast becoming a norm of the international system, with con-
sensus building around the "right to democratic governance," begin-
ning with this right to "free and fair" elections.28 As early as 1984, a
study by the U.N. Secretary-General commissioned by the General
Assembly on the issue concluded:
[T]he right to popular participation, in its most general terms, does
not appear to be expressly established as such by universal instru-
ments having binding legal value. On the other hand, a number of
international texts of varying legal natures contain elements of
popular participation, and some of these texts go so far as to enun-
ciate a global right to participation.27
As legal doctrine shifted, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali
carried the idea much further. Stating that "[riespect for democratic
principles at all levels of social existence is crucial: in communities,
within States and within the community of States,"2 he argued that
only in this manner can sovereignty and self-determination coexist
without working at cross-purposes.2"
A similar growth took place in global recognition of democratic
principles serving as a source of stability and peace. In 1968, the Secu-
rity Council placed mandatory economic sanctions on the white minori-
ty government of Rhodesia under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
marking the first implicit connection of the protection of civil and polit-
ical rights with the maintenance of international peace and security.30
More recently, Boutros-Ghali has maintained that "[tihere is an obvi-
ous connection between democratic practices-such as the rule of law
and transparency in decision-making-and the achievement of true
peace and security in any new and stable political order,"3" which was
a main purpose of the Westphalian system. The Organization of Amer-
ican States (OAS) has declared representative democracy an "indis-
pensable condition for the stability, peace, and development of the re-
gion," 2 while the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE THIRD WORLD 63 (1995).
26. Franck, supra note 3, at 89, 91.
27. UNITED NATIONS, Study by the Secretary-General on Popular Participation in
its Various Forms as an Important Factor in Development and in the Full Realiza-
tion of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/10, at 36 (1984); quoted in HANNUM,
supra note 7, at 114.
28. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping:
Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 10, U.N. Doc. A/47/277
(1992) [hereinafter An Agenda for Peace].
29. Id.
30. Farer, supra note 3, at 726. See U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev. 1 (1968).
31. An Agenda for Peace, supra note 28, at 34.
32. Farer, supra note 3, at 735; Richard Bloomfield, Advancing Democracy and
Human Rights in the Americas, in ADVANCING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE AMERICAS: WHAT ROLE FOR THE OAS? 5 (1994), cited in Richard Millett, Beyond
Sovereignty: International Efforts to Support Latin American Democracy, 36 J.
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(CSCE) has declared that "pluralistic democracy and the rule of law
are prerequisites for progress in setting up the lasting order of peace,
security, justice and cooperation."" Accordingly, the OAS established
a Unit for Promotion of Democracy, the CSCE, an Office for Democracy
and Human Rights.3
Parallel to these events, intergovernmental organizations have
come to link foreign aid and membership in regional and international
organizations to government compliance with "the principles of democ-
racy," including the establishment of multi-party systems and free and
fair elections. 5 With an aim to promote democratic goals of transpar-
ency and accountability, envisioned as linked to the success of sustain-
able development. 8 the World Bank has rewritten fiscal and trade
policies, procurement rules, civil service requirements and administra-
tive law, and regulations regarding policy areas such as labor, health
care, and the environment, imposing their adoption as conditions for
acquiring loans for projects.37 Some developing countries have already
expressed the sentiment that similar conditionalities dictating domes-
tic financial policies that states must undertake to receive loans from
INTERAM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 1, 5 (1995).
33. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimen-
sion of the CSCE, 29 I.L.M. 1305, 1307 (1990), cited in Scheffer, supra note 3, at
276-77. The argument over the Kantian principle concerning whether democracy
leads to global or regional peace is well beyond the scope of this article and is ad-
dressed extensively elsewhere. For the original concept, see C. FRIEDRICH, THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF KANT: IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL AND POLITICAL WRITINGS 430-76 (1949).
34. See, respectively: Millett, supra note 32, at 3; and James Steinberg, Interna-
tional Involvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT, supra note
1, at 57.
35. E.g., COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIVTH GENERAL REPORT
ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1990, at 267 (1991); cited in
Andrew Moravcsik, Lessons from the European Human Rights Regime, in ADVANCING
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 42. See also, Pinder, The Europe-
an Community and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, in BUILDING DEMOC-
RACY?, supra note 3, at 124 (citing from the "Europe Agreements"). See generally
Graham T. Allison Jr. & Robert P. Beschel Jr., Can the United States Promote De-
mocracy?, 107 POL. SCI. Q. 81 (1992).
36. See THE WORLD BANK, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE
GROWTH 60 (1989) (stating "fh]istory suggests that political legitimacy and consensus
are a precondition for sustainable development"). See also, James Butty, The Democ-
racy Carrot: President Bush's Vision of a New World Order, W. AFR. 603 (Apr. 22,
1991) (stating "there is growing evidence that open societies that value individual
rights, respect the rule of the law, and have open and accountable governments
provide better opportunities for sustained economic development than do closed sys-
tems which stifle individual initiative").
37. According to a World Bank vice-president and general counsel, "conditionality
has thus evolved from macroeconomic measures to detailed reforms affecting the
public administration itself." Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank and "Governance"
Issues in Its Borrowing Members, in THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SE-
LECTED ESSAYS 59 (Franziska Tschofen & Antonio Parra eds., 1991), quoted in Jona-
than Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The World Bank and the De-
mocratization of Development, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 159, 160, n.1 (1993).
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the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are akin to reviving colonial
rule, but it is hard to say they actually violate sovereignty as they are
part and parcel of a voluntary agreement,38 and the practice of condi-
tionalities operated even within Europe long before their use in the
recognition of republics of the former Yugoslavia as newly indepen-
dent--e.g., "sovereign"-states."9
The United Nations also has engaged in conditionalities within
the confines of mediation venues, using peacekeeping and technical as-
sistance as bargaining tools. Beginning with the agreement to assist in
the elections of a newly independent Namibia in 1989, the United
Nations soon found itself with a growing franchise and ever-expanding
authority even prior to the perceived success of multilateralism of the
Gulf War. Although the Special Representative did not have control of
the Namibian election, the U.N. operation was "instrumental" in draft-
ing an electoral law and ensuring compliance with it."0 Also in late
1989, an agreement concerning Western Sahara was reached that
would give the United Nations control over all laws and administration
that it felt might impact on planned elections." An agreement in
1990 in El Salvador called on the United Nations to verify the obser-
vance of fundamental rights and freedoms in the country, giving it the
authority to visit "any place or establishment freely or without prior
notice.""2 Later that year the implementation plan of the Cambodian
38. See Onuf, supra note 12, at 56. One should be careful with this argument,
however, as the moral use of forms of suasion other than pure oratorical debate is
suspect. See DOUGLAS LACKEY, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 156
(1984).
When I was a schoolboy there was a schoolyard bully who used to
punch kids in the arm. If you protested, he punched you ten times. If
you said you like it, he punched you five times. Many said they like it.
It does not follow that the bully did not violate their rights.
Id.
39. A cover letter to the Polish Minorities Treaty, written by Clemenceau, states
as follows:
It has for long been the established procedure of the public law of Eu-
rope that when a State is created, or even when large accessions of
territory are made to an established State, the joint and formal recogni-
tion of the Great Powers should be accompanied by the requirement
that such States should, in the form of a binding international Conven-
tion, undertake to comply with certain principles of Government.
CARLILE MACARTNEY, NATIONAL STATES AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 238 (1934), cited
by Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty and Intervention, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?, supra
note 3, at 239. In regards to the criteria for acceptance of recognition of the former
republics of Yugoslavia, see Steinberg, supra note 34, at 37, as well as Weller, supra
note 17.
40. Chopra, supra note 19, at 79.
41. The Sitation Concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General,
U.N. SCOR, 43rd Sess., 2826th mtg., Sept. 20, at 17, U.N. S/Res/621, (1988); The
Situation Concerning Western Sahara: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR,
45th Sess., at 17 U.N. Doc. S/21360 (1990).
42. William Durch, Epilogue: Peacekeeping in Uncharted Territory, in THE EvO-
VOL. 25:1
DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION
peace accords stated that "administrative agencies, bodies and offices"
would be placed "under the direct control" of the United Nations opera-
tion there.' To James Rosenau, growth in collective administrative
intervention was not unexpected, as it formed part of an amalgam of
interventionary expansion that was building momentum in the elector-
al and peacekeeping areas, just as domestic economies had become
increasingly subject to international management."
With the responsibility of elections oversight has come the under-
standing that such operations should include "reforming or
strengthening governmental institutions." 5 Even traditional U.N. op-
erations have performed tasks of public administration - mail ex-
change by UNDOF (Golan Heights); 6 the running of utilities, schools,
and a hospital by UNIFIL (Lebanon); 7 firefighting and animal control
by UNFICYP (Cyprus)" - but almost all of the U.N. peace support
missions established since 1989 have dealt with "second generation" or
"multidimensional" tasks. Such missions are those that "include a
large civilian component and are mandated explicitly to deal with
socio-political and/or humanitarian aspects of the conflict." 9 The most
comprehensive operation has been UNTAC (Cambodia), which went so
far as to help draft conditions for establishing an interim judiciary
system and provide training for lawyers, judges, and magistrates. 0
LUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 1, at 464.
43. Ben Kiernan, The Inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian Peace
Process: Causes and Consequences, in GENOCIDE AND DEMOCRACY IN CAMBODIA: THE
KHMER ROUGE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 191, 223
(Ben Kiernan ed., 1993) [hereinafter GENOCIDE AND DEMOCRACY]. It provided the
Secretary-General with the ability "to put in place U.N. personnel with unfettered
access to all operations and documents and to require the reassignment or removal
of any Cambodian personnel." Stephen Ratner, The Cambodia Settlement Agreements,
87 AM. J. INTL L. 1, 14 (1993). The departments involved grew to include those in
charge of fisheries, tourism, and historical monuments. Second Progress Report of the
Secretary General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC), 47th Sess., Sept. 21, at 9, U.N. Doc. S/24578 (1992).
44. James Rosenau, Sovereignty in a Turbulent World, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA?,
supra note 3, at 218.
45. An Agenda for Peace, supra note 28, at 32.
46. Mona Ghali, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, in THE EVOLU-
TION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 1, at 160.
47. Mona Ghali, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: 1978-Present, in THE
EVOLUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 1, at 199-200.
48. Karl Birgisson, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, in THE EVOLU-
TION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 1, at 233.
49. Guillot, supra note 1, at 93. Guillot adds that such missions "combine peace-
keeping with peacemaking and peacebuilding at the micro-level." Id.
50. Terrence Duffy, Cambodia Since the Election: Peace, Democracy and Human
Rights?, 15 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 407, 417 (1994). Indeed, ONUSAL in El Salvador
was criticized for not doing enough to reform the judicial system. The Truth Com-
mission of El Salvador, in its report, found constitutional and legal issues not settled
in negotiations, including habeas corpus remedies, due process, and criminal proce-
dure. Mark Ensalaco, Truth Commissions for Chile and El Salvador: A Report and
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Perceptions of relative success in this expansion of governance activity
may have encouraged UNOSOM (Somalia) disastrously to begin estab-
lishing a transitional government in 1993 without a comprehensive
agreement detailing elections, power distribution, or authority of the
United Nations. in implementation.5
IV. THE NEED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE INTERVENTION
'Tis not enough to help the feeble up,
But to support him after.
_ Shakespeare, Timon of Athens
Recent administrative intervention by U.N. peace operations is a
far cry from the U.N.-supervised transfer of West Irian to Indonesia in
1963, where little pressure was made on the latter when it failed to
carry out even an agreed plebiscite. 2 The shift demonstrates partial
recognition by the international community that democracy means
more than just holding elections - a democracy needs a professional
civil service and an independent judiciary to enforce political rights on
a daily basis." Without guaranteed protection of such rights, "exer-
cise of the franchise is meaningless."" It is perhaps for this reason
that the OAS Office of Free Elections was renamed the Office for Dem-
ocratic Institutions and Human Rights.55 Some scholars delineate fur-
ther cautionary notes regarding superficial, short-term multilateral
support of fledgling democracies: that "[flitting an evolutionary histori-
Assessment, 16 HuM. RTS. Q. 656, 667 (1994).
51. Chopra, supra note 19, at 82. Compare Donatella Larch, Somalia's Leaders
Reach Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1993, at A5, and Paul Lewis, Report Faults
Commanders of U.N. Forces in Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1994, at A10. See Fur-
ther Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 & 19
of Resolution 794 (1992), U.N. SCOR. 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25354 (1993), and es-
pecially Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Para-
graph 18 of Resolution 814 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th, U.N. Doc. S/26317 (1993), re-
garding the new UNOSOM mandate stemming from the set of agreements made by
the various Somali factions at Addis Ababa.
52. See generally CHRISTOPHER J. MCMULLEN, MEDIATION OF THE WEST NEW
GuINEA DISPUTE, 1962: A CASE STUDY (1981).
53. Thomas Friedman, A New U.S. Problem: Freely Elected Tyrants, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 1992, at E3 (quoting Michael Sandel), cited by Acevedo, supra note 10, at
154, n.89. This obviously means more even than the "full-scale transition program"
in Cambodia, which included, in addition to free and fair elections, professionalized
army and police force, a return of refugees, the establishment of an independent
judiciary and human rights guarantees. Cf Sonia Han, Building a Peace that Lasts:
The United Nations and Post-Civil War Peace-Building, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
837, 840, 846-47. This also means more than a long-term focus solely on develop-
ment. Cf id. at 879. Han herself notes that it at least requires "cultivation of a civil
society and a political culture that will sustain democratic processes." Id. at 881
(emphasis added).
54. Bloomfield, supra note 32, at 16.
55. See Moravcsik, supra note 35, at 49.
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cal process into a series of deadlines" can create undue anticipatory
pressures on the populace;56 that with decades of past repression it is
nearly impossible to educate large publics as to the full meaning and
benefits of a democratic system; 7 and that the people can conceivably
vote for intolerant or anti-democratic policies.58
Furthermore, national assemblies must generate secondary rules
above and beyond constitutional provisions. It is not always the case
that such laws and regulations are completely congruent with a state's
constitution nor even that they are fully implemented.59 Those
charged with managing transitions to democracy must ensure not only
that non-self-executing agreements be implemented, but that anti-
democratic forces from the former regime be held accountable if they
remain within the new one.' This is especially important in devel-
oping countries, where historically much of the national assets fall
under the direct control of bureaucrats, so civil servants have incen-
tives to manipulate policy to their benefit, and private workers have
incentives to obtain influence through the administration rather than
the legislature.61 Thus, in order for democracy to gain and maintain
56. MOHAMMED AYOOB, THE THIRD WORLD SECURITY PREDICAMENT: STATE MAK-
ING, REGIONAL CONFLICT, AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 32 (1995). See also Thom-
as Friedman, Harm's Way: U.S. Pays Dearly for an Education in Somalia, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1993, at D1 (stating "you don't do nation-building with a stop-
watch"), quoted in Han, supra note 53, at 880.
57. An Examination of the U.N. Peace Plan and Referendum on the Western
Sahara: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and International
Organizations and Africa and markup on H. Con. Res. 214, H. Con. Res. 201, and
H.R. 346 before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., Oct. 8 and 30, 1991, at 33
(testimony of Hurst Hannum, Professor, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tuffs
University); cf. James Gibson & Raymond Duch, Emerging Values in Soviet Political
Culture, in PUBLIC OPINION AND REGIME CHANGE: THE NEW POLITICS OF POST-SOVI-
ET SOCIETIES 82 (Arthur Miller et al. eds., 1993) (stating "the Soviet people
have . . . not come to appreciate fully the need for institutional guarantees for the
rights of their political opponents"). The Haitians, as well, have had tremendous
problems understanding the voting process. E.g., Larry Rohter, Electoral Confusion:
So Far, at Least, Inept is the Kindest Word for Haitian Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, July
2, 1995, §4, at 3.
58. Eric Herring, International Security and Democratization in Eastern Europe,
in BUILDING DEMOCRACY?, supra note 3, at 110. The rise of the Nazi party, the
referendum in favor of the new Peruvian constitution, and the recent election in
Algeria come to mind.
59. Christian Anglade, Democracy and the Rule of Law in Latin America, in
DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY, supra note 3, at 244-45. There were, in fact, many delays
and problems in secondary legislation regarding both judicial and land reform re-
quired under the accords. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Observer Mission in El Salvador, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/24833 (1992).
60. Germaine Hoston, The Activist State and the Challenge of Democratization: A
Comparative Historical Perspective, in BOUND TO CHANGE, supra note 3, at 114. "lIlt
is not enough to have the institutional structures of democratic politics. What mat-
ters is how the institutions work in practice." Id. at 111-12.
61. See John Mukum Mbaku, Bureaucratic Corruption and Policy Reform in
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public legitimacy, new administrations must protect the bureaucracy
from such nondemocratic interference, untangling the "web of influ-
ence" that often pre-existed between administrative and political
elites.6 2 New measures of transparency and accountability could re-
duce such influence, as well as the temptation of personal corruption.
Abuse of administrative discretion is not solely found in the execu-
tive branch, as demonstrated in El Salvador. There, the supreme court
president tried to maintain that the peace accords do not apply to the
judiciary as their negotiation and signature were an executive act. The
new legislature, meanwhile, extended the terms of incumbent judges
thereby blocking the appointment of new judges as required under the
accords." Even administrative reforms supposedly enacted in the in-
terest of professionalism can constitute screens for attempts by the
reigning party to weaken its opponents' political opportunities."
When foreign aid was cut after Peruvian President Fujimori suspended
the constitution in 1994, he agreed to OAS-monitored congressional
elections, but manipulated the process, producing a constitution that
gave him even more administrative power than before.65 Discretion-
ary abuse also can occur just prior to planned elections: in El Salvador,
for instance, the assembly passed a blanket amnesty a week after the
release of the Truth Commission report citing individuals for human
rights violations.6 In Cambodia, civil servants sold millions of dollars
Africa, 19 J. SOC. POL. & ECON. STUD. 149, 151-52 (1994); see also James Scott,
Corruption, Machine Politics and Political Change, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1142
(1969); MYRON WEINER, THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY: PUBLIC PRESSURE AND POLITICAL
RESPONSE IN INDIA 217 (1962); FRED RIGGS, ADMINISTRATION IN DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES: THE THEORY OF PRISMATIC SOCIETY 271 (1964), quoted in MERILEE GRINDLE,
POLITICS AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE THIRD WORLD 15, n.19 (1980). The
failure of the wave of comparative administration activity of the 1960s and 1970s
was largely due to the fact that researchers and consultants ignored the political
role of the bureaucracy, strengthening administrations at the cost of democratic
development. E.g., GERALD E. CAIDEN, ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM COMES OF AGE 53
(1991).
62. Naomi Chazan, Between Liberalism and Statism: African Political Cultures
and Democracy, in POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
81 (Larry Diamond ed., 1993) [hereinafter POLITICAL CULTURE].
63. Holiday & Stanley, supra note 1, at 424. The administration may not actu-
ally have the discretion to initiate certain reforms because of constitutional restric-
tions, as in El Salvador, making it all the more important that the other branches
of government comply with the accords. See Further Report of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, 47th Sess., Oct. 14, U.N.
Doc. S/26581, at 4 (1993).
64. See Mohammed Mohabbat Khan, Politics of Administrative Reform and Reor-
ganization in Bangladesh, 7 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 351, 358 (1987). See also Alan
Doig, Good Government and Sustainable Anti-Corruption Strategies: A Role for Inde-
pendent Anti-Corruption Agencies?, 15 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 151, 156-57 (1995) (stat-
ing "[a]nti-corruption rhetoric sentiments have been a routine feature of politics,
invariably less as a means to longer-term reform than as a means to diffuse opposi-
tion to the incoming regime, placate external agencies and secure tenure on office").
65. Bloomfield, supra note 32, at 14.
66. See MICHAEL R. LITTLE, A WAR OF INFORMATION: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
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of public assets for their personal benefit, including villas, timber from
state forests, and the notorious T-3 prison of the Khmer Rouge."7
The task of professionalizing and de-politicizing the bulk of gov-
ernment personnel is not a new concept, but it took even the Western
democracies many decades to begin." Among developing countries
especially, it poses a persistent problem. Patronage and nepotism was
so extensive in the Turkish democracy of the 1970s, for instance, that
each ministry fell under the jurisdiction of a particular political party,
prompting the military intervention of 1980.69 Such evidence, together
with the more recent military coup in Haiti, should dispel any linger-
ing notions that "free and fair" elections - or even formal institutional
arrangements for a new judiciary and police force - are all that a
state needs to sustain a democracy. Conspicuous military coups do
not provide the only means for officials to rout democracy, as even
formal legal and institutional arrangements can be undermined
through "arbitrariness or corruption in implementation."7' In Nigeria,
for instance, military elites have been able to run the country even
after the democratic transition that began in 1992, simply through
"political engineering" and general corruption. 72 Again, what new de-
mocracies need for their sustainability is a thorough system of ac-
countability, whereby public officials are held responsible for their
actions through transparency, internal and external controls, and on-
going procedures of political compromise as well as an establishment of
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ON EL SALVADOR, 1979-1992, at 175-76
(1994).
67. MARIE MARTIN, CAMBODIA: A SHATIERED SOCIETY 291-93 (1994).
68. The U.S. Pendleton Civil Service Act of 1883, intended to eliminate nepo-
tism, covered only 10 percent of federal workers. N. Joseph Cayer, Public Personnel
and Labor Law, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 283 (Jack Rabin et al.
eds., 1989). Great Britain followed a similar path. R.A.W. Rhodes, State-Building
without a Bureaucracy: The Case of the United Kingdom, in DEVELOPING DEMOCRA-
CY, supra note 3, at 170. "The 'permanent civil service' prior to that time (1780-
1850) differed from its modern counterpart in three significant ways. It was not
permanent, it was not civil, and it was not a service." Id. at 173, quoting Harold
Perkins, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1780-1880 22 (1969).
69. Ergun Ozbudun, State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey, in
POLITICAL CULTURE, supra note 62, at 114. Military coups often follow charges of
bureaucratic corruption. See SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING
SOCIETIES 203 (1968).
70. See Acevedo, supra note 10, at 119. Elections and a new constitution in
themselves "do not guarantee stability and survival" of a democratic system. Shin,
supra note 3, at 144. See also Anglade, supra note 59, at 236 (stating '[Llike elec-
toral accountability, constitutional accountability is a substantive issue, and the
mechanisms that establish accountability cannot be assumed to work simply because
they have a formal constitutional existence"); Farer, supra note 3, at 716 (stating
"[flair elections are a necessary but not sufficient condition for authentic representa-
tive government").
71. Doig, supra note 64, at 153, citing WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOP-
MENT 54 (1992),
72. Mbaku, supra note 61, at 164-65.
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justice.73 Moreover, civil servants need to receive continual training
that stresses an attitude of service, rather than one of control.74 Even
in the United States, as recently as 1962, the Supreme Court cau-
tioned that if the U.S. political system passed a certain point of cor-
ruption, it might be unable to redress itself.7"
Public sector problems do not necessarily all stem from blatant
political influence. In most developing countries, there are chronic
problems of administrative capacity, including "inadequate bureaucrat-
ic structure, limited trained manpower, absence of record-keeping and
statistical procedures, low enforcement priority, or insufficient finan-
cial resources."7" States undergoing transitions to democracy also
commonly experience an administrative "void" or "vacuum" developing
where most of the experienced and educated elites either belonged to
the old regime or were enticed by the comparatively lavish salaries of
the new private sector.77 Moreover, these weakened bureaucracies are
often faced with an overwhelming rash of new and pressing problems,
such as burgeoning levels of unemployment, inflation, and organized
crime.7" New legislatures, especially the more common parliamentary
systems, are themselves often poorly staffed and lack expertise in the
various new issues and relationships they must confront in a demo-
cratic system.79 These transitional States generally suffer from a com-
plete lack of experience with the open and conciliatory bargaining
necessary for democratic politics.'
73. Cahn, supra note 37, at 189.
74. Randall Baker, Democracy Versus Bureaucracy: Transforming the Nature of
the Civil Service in Bulgaria, in COMPARATIVE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: PUTrING U.S.
PUBLIC POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION IN CONTEXT 55 (Randall Baker ed., 1994).
75. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 228-31 (1962), cited in Thomas M. Franck, In-
tervention against Illegitimate Regimes, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL ORDER 165 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991).
76. Antonia Handler Chayes & Abram Chayes, Regime Architecture: Elements
and Principles, in GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 95 (Janne Nolan ed., 1994). See also Mohan Kaul & Paul Collins, Govern-
ments in Transition: Towards a New Public Administration, 15 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV.
199, 202 (1995) (stating "[m]any of the difficulties faced by developing countries are
not solely due to defective or inappropriate policy instruments. They can also result
from complex institutional- mechanisms that make it difficult to implement policy
effectively and from weak policy implementation capabilities"). This becomes even
more important when one realizes that, as in El Salvador, public administration
means much more than setting up institutions such as mayors and judges, but in-
cludes a whole line of basic services such as education and health care. U.N. Doc.
S/1994/1212, at 6 (Oct. 31, 1994).
77. See Peter Frank, Problems of Implementation at the Local Level, in DEVELOP-
ING DEMOCRACY, supra note 3, at 295; MARTIN, supra note 67, at 262.
78. Baker, supra note 74, at 53. See also, generally, Eric M. Rice, Public Admin-
istration in Post-Socialist Eastern Europe, 52 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 116-124 (MarJApr.
1992).
79. Knut Walker & Philip Williams, The Military and Democratization in El
Salvador, 35 J. INTERAM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 39, 70 (1993).
80. E.g., THEO A.J. TOONEN, Analyzing Institutional Change and Administrative
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For "consolidation" of democratic liberalism to occur, political
relationships and arrangements developed in the transition phase need
to become "regularly practiced and habitually accepted.""' Groups
with varying political interests must have an ability to participate
satisfactorily in the political process, where they may willfully channel
their competing desires into peaceful methods of settlement. 2 What
has emerged as a successful scenario in democratizing countries is that
of elite groups negotiating consecutive "pacts" that get them through
the transition in stages," with a process in place that ensures the
"removal of the breakdown potentials from the competitive issue.""
Full political, judicial, and bureaucratic accountability must also exist
for implementation to proceed smoothly.8 These pacts form necessary
characteristics of a successful transition above and beyond negotiated
settlements that may have been reached to end a civil war, as such
settlements often give rise to more disputes and, indeed, potentially
carry seeds of future conflagration if proper procedures for implemen-
tation have not been established.
Transformation: A Comparative View, 71 PUB. ADMIN. 151 (1993).
From the outside, it sometimes seems as though the main problem is
not so much the highly plural political game which is being played, but
the lack of appropriate rules for the game of pluralistic politics. The
game has to be played with inadequate constitutional, political and
cultural rules for the game of consociational politics and joint decision
making which is based upon accommodation and mutual adjustment.
Id. at 160-61.
81. Philippe Schmitter, The Consolidation of Political Democracies: Processes,
Rhythms, Sequences and Types (unpublished, 1991); quoted in Rudolf Tokes, Democ-
racy in Hungary: The First Hundred Days and a Mid-Term Assessment, in BOUND
TO CHANGE, supra note 3, at 184.
82. See Farer, supra note 3, at 717 (stating "[tihe condition precedent for an
enduring democracy is a powerful civil society wherein the inevitable conflicts of
group interest are softened by a collective commitment to compromise"). See also
Tatu Vanhanen, Introduction to STRATEGIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 7 (Tatu Vanhanen
ed., 1992) (stating "[tihe task of political architecture-as opposed to social-is to
formulate and construct political institutions that will provide channels of meaningful
and political participation in particular social circumstances").
83. GUILLERMO O'DONNELL & PHILIPPE SCHMITTER, TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORI-
TARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES 39 (1986);
see also, Shin, supra note 3, at 161.
84. Giuseppe Dipalma, Parliaments, Consolidation, Institutionalization: A Mini-
malist View, in PARLIAMENT AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN SOUTHERN EUROPE:
GREECE, ITALY, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, AND TURKEY 38-39 (Ulrike Liebert & Maurizio
Cotta eds., 1991), cited by Jeffrey Huffman & Mary Gautier, Continuity in Transi-
tions Theory, in 1 RESEARCH ON DEMOCRACY AND SOCIETY: DEMOCRATIZATION IN
EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE 10 (Frederick Weil et al. eds., 1993).
85. Doig, supra note 64, at 153.
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V. IMPLEMENTATION: AN EXTENSION OF POLITICS BY SIMILAR MEANS
'Well, I shan't go, at any rate,' said Alice. 'Besides, that's not a
regular rule; you invented it just now.'
'It's the oldest rule in the book,' said the King.
- Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland
When elite pacts begin with a peace accord that aims at compre-
hensive settlement, those expecting to implement the agreement
should assume that much "will not be honored or achievable in the
field."86 As a result of ongoing reassessment by the parties, implemen-
tation ultimately becomes a political engagement of goal modifica-
tion.87 While U.N. officials focus on the extent to which overall peace
objectives are met, each party to the accord becomes more concerned
with how specific pieces make a real difference in their position." Be-
cause stability constitutes one criterion for measuring the success of a
mediated outcome, full inclusion of parties that can affect the outcome
in both the negotiation and implementation processes is thus neces-
sary.89 Furthermore, any guarantor should avoid insecure contracts in
which one party's incentives to comply diminish once the other party
begins to fulfill its obligations - in this context, implementing agree-
ments must take into account each party's alternative to continued
agreement.m
Invariably, challenges to transition arise early on in the imple-
mentation phase of comprehensive accords. Moroccan forces have ob-
structed MINURSO patrols and supply networks in Western Sahara,
86. Brian Urquhart, Who Can Police the World?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 12,
1994).
87. Clarence Stone, The Implementation of Social Programs: Two Perspectives, 36
J. SOC. ISSUES 13, 34 (1980), quoted in Patricia Wilson, Power, Politics, and Other
Reasons Why Senior Executives Leave the Federal Government, 54 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
12 (JanJFeb. 1994). See also, generally, Giandomenico Majone & Aaron Wildavsky,
Implementation as Evolution, in POLICY STUDIES REVIEW ANNUAL (Howard Freeman
ed., 1978); ERNST B. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION 103 (1964) (stating "[aidministration, instead of appearing in
the guise of a heroic ordering of chaos, assumes the form of continuous negotiation
attentive to the possibility of maximizing common values").
88. In the implementation phase, individual groups are "more concerned with
what they in particular may lose than what all in general may win." EUGENE
BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME (1977), quoted in Soren Winter, Integrating
Implementation Research, in IMPLEMENTATION AND THE POLICY PROCESS: OPENING UP
THE BLACK Box 27 (Dennis J. Palumbo & Donald J. Calista eds., 1990); but cf
DANIEL MAZMANIAN & PAUL SABATIER, IMPLEMENTATION AND PUBLIC POLICY: WITH A
NEW POSTSCRIPT 12 (1989).
89. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CON-
SENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES (1987).
90. David Lax & James Sebenius, The Power of Alternatives or the Limits to
Negotiation, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 109-10 (J. William Breslin &
Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1991).
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for instance."s Invariably, when one party fails to act responsibly, the
other feels obligated to partially renege as well, and thus MINURSO
found the rebel group Polisario increasingly unwilling to cooperate. 2
Similarly, when the Khmer Rouge refused to assemble its troops into
cantonment areas in Cambodia, troops of the other factions left canton-
ment areas on "agricultural leave." 3 In the following year in Angola,
the rebel group UNITA, which at one point had nearly 90 percent of its
troops in cantonment areas, refused to demobilize when the govern-
ment created an "antiriot police" consisting of 25,000 elite troops.9 '
UNITA was thus well-positioned to launch attacks after losing the first
round of elections. Despite efforts to avoid such events in Mozambique,
the same pattern initially surfaced.95 Recalcitrance is seldom limited
to mere foot-dragging; Khmer Rouge elements killed over 100 civilians
in a string of massacres in three months in 1993.96 The State of Cam-
bodia (SOC) government also presented grave challenges for UNTAC,
killing students who were protesting against government corruption
97
and shifting the chain of policymaking to bypass U.N. officials working
within and mandated to control government agencies.98 While the
Dayton accords provide for a human rights ombudsman with the right
to review any government documents and demand cooperation of any
official of Bosnia,99 the UNTAC experience shows that this role will be
difficult, if not impossible, without constant backstopping with NATO
and U.N. officials.
Actors can wield more power to affect events in the implementa-
tion phase than during negotiations. Operations failing to take this
fact into account are bound to fail."° As negotiations inadequately
considered the motivations of local factions in Somalia, for example,
without full disarmament it was "naive to imagine" that democratic
91. Durch, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, in
THE EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING, supra note 1, at 428.
92. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102D CONG., 2D SESS.,
THE WESTERN SAHARA: THE REFERENDUM PROCESS IN DANGER 6 (Comm. Print
1992). See also Durch, supra note 91, at 412.
93. Michael Doyle & Ayaka Suzuki, Transitional Authority in Cambodia, in THE
UNITED NATIONS AND CIvIL WARS, supra note 1, at 133.
94. Angola: The Aftermath of Elections, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Africa
of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives 102d Cong. 10 (testimony
by Duncan Sellars, Chairman, International Freedom Foundation).
95. Andrew Meldru, Mozambique: Avoiding Another Angola, 38 AFR. REP. 46, 47-
48 (1992) (stating delays by RENAMO to assemble in cantonment areas led to de-
lays by government forces, and skirmishes took place as a result).
96. Kiernan, Introduction to GENOCIDE AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 43, at 25.
97. Kiernan, supra note 43, at 236.
98. Doyle & Suzuki, supra note 93, at 138 (regarding budgetary issues); MARTIN,
supra note 65, at 295 (regarding security issues).
99. Smith & Priest, supra note 4.
100. BRIAN HOGWOOD & LEWIS GUNN, POLICY ANALYSIS FOR THE REAL WORLD
215 (1984), quoted in Crawford Morgan, Asbestos Policy and Practice in a Local
Authority, in IMPLEMENTATION IN PUBLIC POLICY 50 (Talib Younis ed., 1990).
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elections could take place." 1 Others have warned that the Western
Sahara plan, with a "winner-take-all" referendum, is a recipe for disas-
ter because it does not detail terms for dismantlement or withdrawal
of the loser's troops.0 2 The Dayton accords similarly failed to ade-
quately address the role of the armed forces after elections or in the
process of establishing a central administration."w At root in the re-
turn of hostilities to Angola was that the United Nations was only to
"verify that the monitoring groups were assuming their responsibili-
ties,""0 4 and thus had no mandate to actually implement-let alone
enforce-the demobilization required under the accords. In contrast,
while the Mozambique agreement discounted U.N. oversight,
UNOMOZ obtained assurance of full disarmament and U.N. control be-
fore the elections. 05 Especially difficult in dealing with recalcitrant
parties is the reconciliation of enforcement with impartiality. When the
Security Council finally took moderate action in Cambodia after initial-
ly avoiding confrontation, UNTAC seemed unprepared for the re-
sponse. In retaliation for the imposition of economic sanctions, the
Khmer Rouge took U.N. personnel hostage and shelled U.N. posi-
tions'" - actions mirrored in May 1995 by Bosnian Serbs against
UNPROFOR when the Security Council attempted to impose its au-
thority with "pinprick" bombing raids."
Failure to take a holistic viewpoint of implementation also has led
101. John Mackinlay, Military Responses to Complex Emergencies, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND CIVIL WARS, supra note 1, at 53.
102. See Durch, Getting Involved: The Political-Military Context, in THE EVOLU-
TION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 1, at 33.
103. There were no arrangements to integrate the rival armies, and the Bosnian
Serbs were only vaguely required to reduce their military potential to a level where
it was "no longer a threat" to the accords prior to elections. Michael Dobbs, Balkan
Leaders Approve Bosnian Pact, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1995, at A21. "Mafia" groups
that emerge well-armed and well-financed from the conflict have also come to run
major parts of the government involved infrastructure development, and have "little
interest in peace agreements or the return of the rule of law." Chris Hedges, A War-
Bred Underworld Threatens Bosnia Peace, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1996, at A8.
104. Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Angola Verification
Mission, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., May 20, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/22627 (1991). Boutros-
Ghali made this even clearer in a later report: "According to the Peace Accords and
the mandate of the Security Council, UNAVEM II is in Angola not to organize or
implement the cease-fire and electoral arrangements, but to observe and verify the
monitoring of their implementation by the Angolan parties themselves." U.N. SCOR,
Further Report of the Secretary General of United Nations Angola Verification Mis-
sion (UNAVEM II), 47th Sess., Sept. 9, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/24556 (1992).
105. Andrew Meldru, Mozambique: Lessons from Angola, 38 AFR. REP. 22, 24
(1993).
106. Amer, supra note 1, at 218.
107. It is also frustrating to see that the Security Council has yet to deal with
Boutros-Ghali's call in early 1992 to "gravely consider what action should be taken
towards those who put United Nations personnel in danger," despite a recent con-




to grave errors. A significant underlying cause of the UNITA troop
exodus from cantonment areas in Angola was the loss of troop morale
and organization due to severe shortages of food, medicine, and cloth-
ing." The United Nations also has made proposals that would vio-
late newly drafted -constitutions,"° or has apparently failed to take
note of local norms in bargaining styles or informal infrastructure."1
These shortcomings in planning have helped to stymie Boutros-Ghali's
vision "to ensure that the original causes of war are eradicated,""' by
failing to remove "breakdown potentials" necessary, as noted above, for
democratic consolidation to occur. Given such concerns, the observation
that U.N. officials, facing failure to achieve goals, have had a tendency
to "hang tight" and settle for partial successes in peace operations is
alarming."' While it is generally understood that comprehensive
peace entails comprehensive institutional reform, no movement has
emerged to actualize the concept of peace operations as a continuous
process stretching from initial negotiation through long-term imple-
mentation. Moreover, implementation oversight needs to focus on the
parties' perceptions and mind sets, just as third parties are required to
do during the original negotiations."' Harboring and maintaining a
108. See Virginia Page Fortna, United Nations Angola Verification Mission II, in
THE EVOLUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 1, at 399-400.
109. The United Nations stood behind the report of the Truth Commission, which
recommended new appointments to the judiciary and a 10-year ban on certain in-
dividuals from running for public office, although the constitution forbids the presi-
dent from removing justices not convicted of a crime, and guarantees every citizen a
right to participate in government. The Peace Process in El Salvador, Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Affairs, House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
March 16 and 23, at 41 (comment by Rep. Cass Ballenger). "Lustration" laws seek-
ing to ban from civil service officials associated with the former regime and later
found unconstitutional have been commonplace in Central and Eastern Europe. E.g.,
COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN BULGARIA (1992).
110. The Somali approach to dispute settlement favors lengthy and open-ended
discussion, rather than the fixed-schedule-and-agenda format arranged by U.N. offi-
cials. Debarati Sapir & Hedwig Deconnick, The Paradox of Humanitarian Assistance
and Military Intervention in Somalia, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND CIvIL WARS,
supra note 1, at 168. Also, "[n]either the United Nations nor the more responsible
and reflective donor agencies gave enough thought to identifying local institutions or
groups in order to strengthen them for the future." Id. at 163.
111. Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General
on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. Doc.
S/1995/1, 122 [hereinafter Supplement to An Agenda for Peace]. Peacebuilding oper-
ations are meant to serve as a counterweight to preventive diplomacy, preventing
crisis from recurring. An Agenda for Peace, supra note 28, at 33.
112. See Durch, supra note 100, at 30. See also An Examination of the U.N.
Peace Plan and Referendum on the Western Sahara, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Africa, House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, October 8 and 9, 1991, at 21-22 (testimony
by Lawrence Farley, Professor, Lock Haven University). "For all its fairness and
objectivity, MINURSO will have spent upward to $200 million by the time an elec-
tion is held in Western Sahara. There will be a strong inclination for MINURSO to
dismiss known irregularities as unimportant." Id. Cf Urquhart, supra note 84.
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holistic viewpoint is essential for public service reform, and could not
be made any less important by prevalent civil strife in a state's recent
past."1
U.N. policymakers, therefore, should certify that each stage of the
implementation process is devised so that each party is assured the
other is complying, as at each step the parties are likely to use what-
ever resources available to garner power."' Continuation of game-
playing would surely stretch win-lose competition to the consolidation
phase of implementation. Ambiguities need to be highlighted early so
that those supervising implementation can draw contingencies "to
enable disputes to be carried on within reasonable bounds.""' Ill-
defined objectives may give rise to one party's disillusionment as per-
ceptions of unsatisfied goals emerge, jeopardizing the party's willing-
ness to continue compliance." 7 Clear and detailed mandates for U.N.
peacekeeping operations would help set expectations and minimize
disagreement over interpretation."'
Even with a clear mandate in relation to implementation, howev-
er, some underlying perceived conflicts of interest would remain. Nego-
tiation does not end with a given accord, "but is a continuous aspect of
living under the agreement,"' necessitating development of proce-
dures the parties can and will use on their own to resolve their dis-
putes satisfactorily and in a peaceful manner - procedures that would
113. "It is not enough for negotiations to achieve a brokered compromise
agreement, a political agreement hammered together under the pressure
of outside powers .... The negotiations must produce a resolution of
the conflict, that is, an outcome that satisfies the basic needs for identi-
ty, security, and dignity-and that both consider to be at least minimal-
ly consistent with the requirements of justice and fairness."
Herbert C. Kelman, A Behavioral Science Perspective on the Study of War and Peace,
in PERSPECTIVES ON BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE: THE COLORADO LECTURES 268 (Richard
Jessor ed., 1991). Note that the preamble to the Constitution of UNESCO reads:
"Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses
of the people must be constructed."
114. Kaul & Collins, supra note 76, at 201.
115. LIONEL CLIFFE, THE TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE IN NAMIBIA 81 (1994).
116. HUGH HECLO & AARON WILDAVSKY, THE PRIVATE GOVERNMENT OF PRIVATE
MONEY (1974), quoted in David Lewis, Conclusion: Improving Implementation, in
POLICIES INTO PRACTICE: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CASE STUDIES IN IMPLEMEN-
TATION 221 (David Lewis & Helen Wallace eds., 1984).
117. David Pyle, From Pilot Project to Operational Program in India: The Prob-
lems of Transition, in POLITICS AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE THIRD WORLD,
supra note 61, at 123, 141.
118. DIEHL, supra note 1, at 72-73. See, e.g., Chayes & Chayes, From Law En-
forcement to Dispute Settlement: A New Approach to Arms Control Verification and
Compliance, 14 INT'L SEC. 147 (1990). "Questions of interpretation and disputes
about the meaning and application of the governing rules are an inevitable feature
of life under any complex legal regulatory regime." Id. at 163.
119. Chayes & Chayes, Compliance without Enforcement: State Behavior under
Regulatory Treaties, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 311, 313 (1991).
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demonstrate the values of democratic interaction for later periods in a
state's development.
VI. ENSURING COMPLIANCE MAINTENANCE
You know what the trouble with peace is? No organization.
- Bertold Brecht, Mutter Courage
Multidimensional operations generally have lacked comprehensive
systems to deal with disputes, first demonstrated in Namibia, where
different interpretations of a demobilization clause and lack of commu-
nication sparked the deadliest fighting of the entire war. 2'
Peacekeeping troops have traditionally dealt with alleged violations
and disputes over interpretation of accords as part of their duties, 1'
but not until El Salvador did a compliance verification commission
formally emerge. An Administrative Consultative Body was proposed
in Cambodia when the parties' implementing authority began to have
problems, but this plan was rejected." In Angola, when a body cre-
ated by the parties to verify compliance with the accords became inef-
fective, U.N. observers not only helped resolve disputes but carried out
verification responsibilities of the parties themselves, yet lacked au-
thority to do more.' The compliance oversight body in El Salvador
itself deepened rather than overcame stalemate, partly because, as in
Angola, it was comprised of an equal number from both parties.
ONUSAL thus assisted the negotiation of new agreements," aided
by its mandate to monitor "all agreements" concluded between the par-
ties." One observer concluded that a process should be "organized
and monitored by international organizations and interested govern-
ments in order to engage the dynamic process of constant negotiations,
heighten the cost of failure, and secure additional support for the nego-
tiations and implementation of the peace agreement."'26 The peace
accords in Mozambique are unique in creating a supervisory commis-
120. See CLIFFE, supra note 113, at 84; DIEHL, supra note 1, at 160; DONALD
SPARKS & DECEMBER GREEN, NAMIBIA: THE NATION AFTER INDEPENDENCE 49-50
(1992).
121. DIEHL, supra note 1, at 9.
122. Amer, supra note 1, at 216.
123. Fortna, supra note 108, at 392.
124. Cristina Eguizabal, Regional Leadership and Universal Implementation in El
Salvador's Quest for Peace, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND CIvIL WARS, supra note 1,
at 186. On the problem of the body's composition, see Holiday & Stanley, supra note
1, at 428, as well as U.N. SCOR, Report of the Secretary General on the United
Nations Angola Verification Mission, supra note 104.
125. Holiday & Stanley, supra note 1, at 416 n.3.
126. Joseph Sullivan, How Peace Came to El Salvador, 38 ORBIs 83, 84 (1994).
Jarat Chopra also recommends the creation of joint monitoring commissions at the
local level so that "unique peace agreements, the conventional source of objectives to
be implemented on the ground could be interpreted jointly, regularly, and account-
ably." CHOPRA, Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 1, at 34.
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sion that included outside parties, although, without a U.N. chair,
differences still arose.'2
Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes argue that a system to main-
tain compliance requires a strong normative bases that is perceived as
fair and nondiscriminatory; transparency measures and ongoing review
of possible noncompliance; with capacity building assistance for the
parties and procedures for dispute settlement; and flexibility.
In the process, the circumstances advanced in mitigation or excuse
of nonperformance are systematically addressed. Those that seem
to have substance are dealt with; those that do not are exposed.
Often the upshot is agreement on a narrower and more concrete
definition of the required performance, adapted to the circumstanc-
es of the case.. . [Blut if a party persistently fails to respond, the
possiblilty of diffuse manifestations is present in the back-
ground.
28
A notable example of such a managerial process is the Interna-
tional Labour Organization, which requires regular reporting, has
thorough procedures to identify noncompliance, makes suggestions for
members to meet requirements, and blacklists those that fail to carry
out such measures." Numerous other treaty regimes effectively use
such "shaming" procedures of enforcement, and some scholars have
called for their use in supporting democratic transitions. 3 ° While
most such activity by U.N. peace missions has been informal and ad
hoc, ONUSAL nonetheless issued a formal report on compliance in
1992 that led to increased external pressure on the Salvadoran govern-
ment.' U.N. advisors Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, with
El Salvador in mind, argue that the Security Council should "maintain
127. The Supervisory and Monitoring Commission was comprised of members of
the parties, plus France, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. It was to "guarantee the implementation of the agreement, assume re-
sponsibility for authentic interpretation of it, settle any disputes that may arise
between the parties and guide and coordinate the activities of the other commis-
sions." Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Operation in Mozam-
bique (ONUMOZ), U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Dec. 3, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/24892 (1992).
The first disputes to resolve were between the two parties and ONUMOZ itself.
Report of Secretary General on United Nations Operations in Mozambique, U.N.
SCOR 48th Sess., June 30, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/26034 (1993). Nevertheless, progress
seemed better than in other operations. See Report of the Secretary General on Unit-
ed Nations Operations in Mozambique, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Aug. 30, U.N. Doc.
S/26385 (1993).
128. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COM-
PLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 26 (1995).
129. Id. See generally HAAS, supra note 87.
130. E.g., Moravcsik, supra note 35, at 56-57.
131. Holiday & Stanley, supra note 1, at 421-22. In Namibia, when regulations
for the running of elections were first promulgated, foreign governments called them
"completely unacceptable," prompting negotiations between the government and the
U.N. special representative to make changes. CLIFFE, supra note 115, at 130.
VOL. 25:1
DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION
its grip" on compliance monitoring:132
The issue that arises now is how to move away from a peacekeep-
ing operation strictu sensu-i.e., one involving military and police
personnel-to an operation in which the UN can continue discharg-
ing its verification and good offices responsibilities, without losing
the momentum provided by pressure from the international com-
munity through the council, and in doing so how to harness the
programs and agencies of the UN system so that they work toward
the same goal of peace consolidation. 3'
Desired ends of the parties go beyond pro forma requirements of
peace accords, however, and thus intergovernmental arrangements to
monitor and guarantee peace agreements should be long-lasting. As
many countries lack the capacity to metamorphose a one-party bureau-
cracy into an apolitical public service, outside pressure and assistance
may be necessary."3 In recognition of this, some within the OAS
have called for the establishment of a mediation and reconciliation
service to "preempt" threats to democratic order among its mem-
bers.3 The Cypriot town of Pyla, where Greek and Turkish Cypriots
coexist with a dual-mayoral system, could serve as an informal exam-
ple for such a service, as UNFICYP officers have successfully mediated
disputes between the mayors.'36 Inevitable wrangling among parties
over quotidian affairs in public administration make it imperative for
the United Nations to seriously consider the concept of "reserve units
of blue hats, training as weekend administrators"1 7 for all compre-
132. De Soto & Del Castillo, Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements,
supra note 1, at 202.
133. Id. at 191.
134. GERALD CAIDEN, Administrative Reform, in COMPARATIVE PUBLIC MANAGE-
MENT 115 (1991). Alan Doig argues that "[ainti-corruption agencies will require both
donor operation and coordination over a number of years .... . Doig, supra note 64,
at 163.
135. Millett, supra note 32, at 18. The OAS also expressed its commitment to
"defense of democracy" in the hemisphere. Organization of American States, General
Assembly, The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-
American System. OEA/SER. P/XXI.O.2 (1991), cited in Bloomfield, supra note 32, at
13. The guarantee of a state's form of government by a collective of external states
dates at least as far back as the 1863 Treaty of London, under which Great Britain,
France, and Russia guaranteed the status of Greece as "a monarchical, independent,
and constitutional state." IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE BY STATES 318 (1963), cited by Wippman, supra note 10, at 613, n.32. Medi-
ated settlement of civil strife also has been guaranteed by external governments
before, as with the Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee (Aug. 16) 382 U.N.T.S. 3 (1960),
cited by Wippman, supra note 10, at 633.
136. Marlise Simons, Pyla Journal: In a Small Town on Torn Cyprus, the Tween
Meet, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1991, at A4.
137. Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in Africa: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Africa of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives 103d Cong., 1st
Sess., at 21 (1994) (statement of I. William Zartman, Professor, Paul H. Nitze School
of Advanced International Studies). William Durch and Barry Blechman also support
1996
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
hensive settlements, to provide good offices, smooth out ambiguities
and misunderstandings, and promote international disapprobation
when a party blatantly deviates from agreed measures. Such activity
could lie under the mandate, for instance, of a new U.N. Social Coun-
cil, the Trusteeship Council as transformed into a Council on Diversity,
Representation and Governance, or a new Peace-Building Unit, which
have been proposed recently as sorely needed U.N. structural chang-
es.
138
The U.N. Secretariat should play a role in such post-conflict com-
pliance maintenance arrangements. Its assistance in dispute settle-
ment has come to be seen as "a necessity rather than an intru-
sion,""9 as the generally accepted powers of the Secretary-General
under article 99 of the Charter have moved well beyond even "good
offices" and the conduct of enquiries," with acceptance of mediation
by the Secretary-General itself construed as acknowledgement that a
dispute is a matter of legitimate international concern."' Secretaries-
General long have helped draft framework agreements containing con-
stitutional elements, including U Thant in the Congo, Javier Perez de
Cu~llar in Cyprus, and Boutros-Ghali in Bosnia."' Under art. 33(1)
of the Charter, a state may opt to bring in any outside party to aid in
peaceful settlement through a variety of measures, including binding
authority. The Secretary-General assumed such a role in the North
Borneo dispute in 1963, the Bahrain dispute in 1970, and the Rainbow
Warrior dispute of 1986."' As part of a voluntary settlement, such
the idea of "continued monitoring by a small, free-roving observer group, technical
advice, integrated development assistance, or some combination of all three." WIL-
LIAM DURCH & BARRY BLECHMAN, KEEPING THE PEACE: THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE
EMERGING WORLD ORDER 48 (1992).
138. Respectively: THE UNITED NATIONS IN ITS SECOND HALF-CENTURY 40 (The
Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations ed., 1995);
ERSINE CHILDERS & BRIAN URQUHART, RENEWING THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM,
201-02 (Development Dialogue, 1994); and Han, supra note 53, at 878-79.
139. Chopra, supra note 19, at 87.
140. Under art. 99, the Secretary-General may report matters which he deems
threaten international peace and security to the Security Council or the General
Assembly. It has been successfully argued that the ability to conduct enquiries and
the provision of "good offices" is crucial for such determinations. E.g., K. VENKATA
RAMAN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS (1977).
141. JOHN MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 23 (1991).
142. See, respectively: Durch, The UN Operation in the Congo, in EVOLUTION OF
UN PEACEKEEPING, supra note 1, at 343; Report by the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Operation in Cyprus, Addendum, U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/18102/Add.1; and Report of the Secretary General on the International Conference
on the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Nov. 11, U.N. Doc. S/24795
(1992).
143. Respectively: MAX HARRELSON, FIRES ALL AROUND THE HORIZON 154 (1989);
U THANT, VIEW FROM THE U.N. 50 (1978); Jodi Wexler, The Rainbow Warrior Affair:
State and Agent Responsibility for Authorized Violations of International Law, 5 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 389, 401 (1987).
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authority can be likened to acceptance of inspections of nuclear facili-
ties by the International Atomic Energy Agency.'" The arrangements
made, including the designation of a third party, would be elements of
voluntary implementing agreements,'" aiming at the consolidation of
democratic forces to allow for maximum political input by all sides and
avoid a relapse into civil conflict.1" It also can be argued that once a
settlement has been signed by parties, the world community recognizes
as jointly representing the will of the state, the agreement cannot be
amended or abrogated by a new state government unless all the orig-
inal parties agree." As Jarat Chopra writes, "joint monitoring com-
missions might ... offer a means of reconciling the sovereignty-inter-
vention stalemate."'"
VII. CONCLUSION
It is getting to be harder to run a constitution than to frame one.
- Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration"
In addition to electoral, judicial, military and police reforms cov-
ered to some extent in recent "comprehensive" peace accords, peace-
144. Ratner, supra note 41, at 24. There should be no problem with such an ar-
rangement if enforcement is under the hands of the Security Council and monitoring
and negotiation and traditional peacekeeping and civilian affairs in the hands of the
Secretary-General. For those who feel recalcitrant parties will not differentiate be-
tween them, note the Serb proposal to release U.N. peacekeepers held hostage in
return for a lifting of U.N. sanctions against Serbia-under the condition that veri-
fication of compliance be conducted by the Secretary-General, and not the Security
Council. Stephen Kinzer, In Belgrade, Milosevic Stiffens in Talks, N.Y. TIMES, June
3, 1995, at 4.
145. "In order for the disputants to be genuinely motivated to reach agreement, a
third party must acknowledge, and must help the principals to understand, the im-
portance of their autonomy; it is their set of decisions to make and their dispute to
resolve." JEFFREY RUBIN, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR
507 (Ralph White ed., 1986). Cf MERRILLS, supra note 142, at 86. In fact, if an
arbitrator does not stick to his mandate, his decision can be challenged as a nullity
under international law. Id. at 88-89.
146. Note that the new Constitution of South Africa, for instance, includes mea-
sures to deal with disputes "arising from the implementation of the provisions of the
Constitution dealing with transitional arrangements and the rationalization of public
administration." Zola Skweyiya & Sibusisio Vil-Nkomo, Government in Transition: A
South African Perspective, 15 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 217, 220 (1995).
147. Wippman, supra note 10, at 627, 631. Indeed, the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice ruled that limitations on sovereignty a state accepts under treaty
cannot be renounced later as an impermissible infringement on that state's sover-
eignty. Id. at 616 (citing The S.S. Wimbledon, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 25).
There is still the problem of measuring government performance vis-A-vis the general
public, yet intervention in this regard is more difficult to justify in terms of violat-
ing the principle of sovereignty. See Hage Geingob, From Colonialism to Freedom
and Democracy: Role of an Effective Public Service in the Political Transition-the
Namibian Experience, 15 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 211 (1995).
148. Chopra, Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 1, at 34.
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building mandates need to address long-term challenges.149 Such an
effort should move beyond the present haphazard and uncoordinated
work of the U.N. Development Programme, the U.N. High Commission
for Refugees, the U.N. Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
the U.N. Children's Fund, the World Food Program, the Food and
Agricultural Organization, the World Health Organization, the U.N.
Population Fund, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the Interna-
tional Labor Organization, the World Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund.15° While Ernst Haas and Peter Haas may be correct
in stating that "collective security, human rights protection, democra-
tization, and the fostering of ethnic self-determination do not warrant
being made into a single comprehensive problematique," 5' linkages
must be made in both planning and programming to take account of
problems confronting these areas during long-term implementation of
comprehensive accords, at least in terms of a monitoring and feedback
process aimed at ongoing conciliation that has a centralized point of
oversight.152
There is symmetry in the need of the Secretary-General to con-
duct inquiries and rely on his position at the center of informal inter-
national communication networks, not just as conflict begins, but after
it has ended.153 Some states have shown disdain for post-conflict
"quasi-diplomatic" missions of the Secretary-General,'" but a central-
ized body is necessary to guarantee full implementation of comprehen-
sive accords. As Boutros-Ghali stated, a withdrawal of operations
needs to take into account "residual verification for which the United
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Nations remains responsible,"" and he has begun to voice added
concerns over the corrupt bureaucracies and lingering distrust that
plague new governments.' The Secretariat has the ability to assem-
ble and coordinate teams of administration experts to address such
concerns, and, indeed, Dag Hammarskjold felt that the United Nations
alone could provide such assistance.'57
There have been instances outside the U.N. Trusteeship system
where central administrative authority was transferred to, or overseen
by, an international body. In 1897, the European powers established
an administrative commission in Crete, and again in 1900 in
Beijing.' In the 1920s and 1930s, the Free City of Danzig and the
Memel Territory operated under arrangements giving the League of
Nations power of final arbiter, the Saar territory had an administra-
tive body that included representatives of "interested" states,'59 and a
Commission of the League governed Leticia for a year in its transition
from Peruvian to Columbian rule.'o Pursuant to a treaty signed at
the end of the second World War, the Security Council was to appoint
a governor for the Free Territory of Trieste, with powers to veto legis-
lation counter to human rights provisions of the treaty, although the
advent of the Cold War made it impossible for the Council to agree on
a nominee.' There were also the U.N. administration in Libya from
1949 to 1952, the U.N. Temporary Executive Authority of West New
Guinea from 1962 to 1963 and, albeit briefly, administrative control by
ONUC in the Congo in 1961."62
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Concerns about a renewal of neo-colonialist attitudes and relation-
ships should not be taken lightly. It is partly to assuage such appre-
hensions, in fact, that Boutros-Ghali has suggested that
decisionmaking over peacebuilding activities be shifted from the Secu-
rity Council to another intergovernmental body." Such a body
should be created by the General Assembly to show democratic respect
on the global level, but with substantial attachment to an authorita-
tive group within the Office of the Secretary-General so that ongoing
planning, negotiation, and coordination with a long-term outlook go
into each new operation from the beginning, rather than the United
Nations operating "by the collective seat of the international commun-
ity's pants."' Without such metaphorical suspenders, some new de-
mocracies would surely slip through the community's fingers. The Gen-
eral Assembly also has the power to allow such a body to seek advisory
judgments from the International Court of Justice ex aequo et bono,
with a view to conciliation as well as justice, under art. 38 of the
Court's statute and article 96 of the Charter. Such less-than-strictly-
adjudicatory rulings could promote the true beauty of democratic prac-
tices. Surely this is what the international community has been trying
to accomplish, although it has failed to express this in either its ac-
tions or focus. The United Nations should be prepared to lead combat-
ants in states such as Bosnia-Hercegovina to devise - and maintain
- a system of peaceful means of resolving political disputes that occur
in the implementation of comprehensive peace accords, helping to
stabilize the new political arrangements and curtail the reemergence of
political violence.
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